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Clouded Precedent:
Tandon v. Newsom and its Implications
for the Shadow Docket
ALEXANDER GOUZOULES †
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s “shadow docket”—the decisions
issued outside its procedures for deciding cases on the
merits—has drawn increasing attention and criticism from
scholars, commentators, and elected representatives. Shadow
docket decisions have been criticized on the grounds that they
are made without the benefit of full briefing and argument,
and because their abbreviated, per curiam opinions can be
difficult for lower courts to interpret.
A spate of shadow docket decisions in the context of freeexercise challenges to COVID-19 public health orders
culminated in Tandon v. Newsom, a potentially
groundbreaking decision that may upend longstanding
doctrines governing claims brought under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. 1 But Tandon also introduces
an element of uncertainty. Will lower courts treat it as they
would a merits decision, or will they apply it with caution,
given its status as a shadow docket case?

†Westerfield Fellow at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.
1. 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).
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After reviewing the existing literature on the shadow
docket and explaining the potential significance of Tandon,
this Article examines the initial decisions that have grappled
with the case. Noting that some judges have treated Tandon
as a major shift in free-exercise law, while others have
minimized or essentially ignored it, I suggest that in several
respects Tandon is similar to Bush v. Gore, another per
curiam opinion that some courts have been reluctant to apply
as precedent. The experience of Tandon suggests that
pronouncements in the Supreme Court’s shadow docket
opinions do not produce the same level of consistency and
legal certainty as those in merits opinions, providing further
evidence for those arguing that the Court’s current shadow
docket practices warrant reform.
INTRODUCTION
Religion, law, and public health are separated by an
active fault line, and these disputes have increasingly led to
significant Supreme Court opinions issued in non-merits
cases. The tension between the Affordable Care Act’s
contraceptive-coverage mandate and employers who object to
providing benefit plans that facilitate acts contrary to their
religious teachings gave rise to nine years of divisive,
contentious, and ultimately indecisive litigation. 2 The
2. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367, 2373 (2020) (“The ACA’s contraceptive mandate . . . has existed
for approximately nine years. Litigation surrounding that requirement has lasted
nearly as long.”); see, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. 403 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958
(2014); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated,
Zubik, 578 U.S. 403; Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, Zubik, 578 U.S. 403; Sharpe Holdings, Inc.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. v. CNS Int’l
Ministries, 84 U.S.L.W. 3626 (May 16, 2016) (No. 15-775); Dordt Coll. v. Burwell,
801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated, Burwell v. Dordt Coll., 578 U.S. 968 (2016);
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir.
2014), vacated, Zubik, 578 U.S. 403; Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d
547 (7th Cir. 2014), vacated, 575 U.S. 901 (2015); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654
(7th Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health

2022]

CLOUDED PRECEDENT

89

Supreme Court ultimately issued a per curiam order
encouraging the parties to “arrive at an approach going
forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise
while at the same time ensuring that women covered by
petitioners’ health plans receive ‘full and equal health
coverage.’” 3 In a significant development for the shadow
docket, that order, though not a final ruling on the merits,
was viewed by some circuit courts as weighing on the merits
of the case. 4
Another tectonic shift in the religion-and-health context
was triggered by dozens of challenges to emergency
COVID-19 orders limiting the size of public gatherings,
including religious services, during the initial waves of the
global pandemic. 5 Plaintiffs argued that these emergency
& Hum. Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), vacated, Burwell, 573 U.S. 682.
3. Zubik, 578 U.S. at 408 (quoting Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 1,
Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. 403 (2016) (No. 14-1418)).
4. See, e.g., Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 944 (“[T]he Court’s orders were not
final rulings on the merits . . . [but] at the very least collectively constitute a
signal that less restrictive means exist by which the government may further its
interests.”).
5. See, e.g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341
(7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1753 (2021); S. Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir.), application for injunctive relief
denied, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct.
2563 (2021) (mem.); Bullock v. Carney, 463 F. Supp. 3d 519 (D. Del.), aff’d, 806
F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2020); Tolle v. Northam, 827 F. App’x 338 (4th Cir. 2020);
Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020); DiMartile v. Cuomo, 820 F. App’x
62 (2d Cir. 2020); Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (D.N.M.
2020), aff’d sub nom. Legacy Church, Inc. v. Collins (10th Circ. 2021); Calvary
Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 459 F. Supp. 3d 273 (D. Me.), appeal dismissed, 984
F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 71 (2021); Cassell v. Snyders, 458
F. Supp. 3d 981, 988 (N.D. Ill. 2020), aff'd, 990 F.3d 539 (2021); Antietam
Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, 461 F. Supp. 3d 214, 224 (D. Md.), appeal dismissed,
No. 20-1579, 2020 WL 6787532 (July 6, 2020); Capitol Hill Baptist Church v.
Bowser, 496 F. Supp. 3d 284 (D.D.C. 2020); Denver Bible Church v. Azar, 494 F.
Supp. 3d 816 (D. Colo.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Church v. Polis, No. 20-1377,
2020 WL 9257251 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2020), injunction denied pending appeal sub
nom. Denver Bible Church v. Becerra, No. 1:20-cv-02362, 2021 WL 1220758 (D.
Colo. Mar. 28, 2021), aff’d in part and dismissed in part sub nom. Church v. Polis,
No. 20-1391, 2022 WL 200661 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022); Soos v. Cuomo, 470 F.
Supp. 3d 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal withdrawn, No. 20-2414 (2d Cir. May 27,
2021); Dwelling Place Network v. Murphy, No. 20-CV-6281, 2020 WL 3056305
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limitations on the size of worship services violated their freeexercise rights under the First Amendment. 6
Initially, these challenges achieved little success. In the
first phase of COVID-19 litigation, from the start of the
pandemic through October 2020, district and appellate
courts generally applied the doctrine set forth in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, holding that Free Exercise Clause
challenges against neutral laws of general applicability—
ones that do not single out religion for discriminatory
treatment—are reviewed under a forgiving rational-basis
standard. 7 Under Smith, public-health regulations that
imposed similar or identical limits on both secular meetings
and religious gatherings (with limited exceptions for
necessities like hospitals and grocery stores) did not trigger
heightened scrutiny. 8 Requests for emergency injunctions
against these orders were thus denied. 9
Having failed to obtain injunctive relief in the lower
courts, several plaintiffs sought emergency review by the
Supreme Court, initially without success. 10 An early
(D.N.J. June 9, 2020); Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610
(6th Cir. 2020).
6. See, e.g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, 962 F.3d at 342–47.
7. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see also Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Can.
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2014);
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1137 (9th Cir. 2009). The rational-basis
test asks only if a governmental action is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational
Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1650–56 (2016).
8. See, e.g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, 962 F.3d at 342, 347; S. Bay
United Pentecostal Church, 959 F.3d at 939; High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis,
835 F. App’x 372, 373, 374 (10th Cir. 2020). But see Neace, 958 F.3d at 415.
9. See Elim Romanian Pentecostal. Church, 962 F.3d at 347; S. Bay United
Pentecostal Church, 959 F.3d at 939; High Plains Harvest Church, 835 F. App’x
at 375; Andrew Wommack Ministries v. Polis, No. 20-1336, 2020 WL 5983978,
at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 5, 2020) (denying application without discussion of merits).
10. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613,
1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive
relief), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.);
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020).
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concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts to a summary denial of
a stay application explained the operation of the Smith
standard in these cases. 11 Roberts also cautioned that the
unelected judiciary, “which lacks the background,
competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not
accountable to the people,” should be particularly reticent to
overrule politically accountable officials where “a party seeks
emergency relief in an interlocutory posture.” 12
But the balance of the Court shifted when Justice
Barrett was confirmed to replace Justice Ginsburg on
October 27, 2020. A new majority soon issued relief in
response to several emergency applications for injunctions
against COVID-19 orders. 13 These decisions culminated in
Tandon v. Newsom, 14 a per curiam opinion that not only
granted relief to religious plaintiffs but also articulated a
dramatic reinterpretation of the longstanding Smith
standard. According to the five-justice majority in Tandon,
strict scrutiny—rather than the more lenient rational-basis
review—is triggered whenever governmental regulations
“treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than
religious exercise.” 15 Thus, an order that treated worship
services more leniently than virtually all categories of
secular mass gatherings would nonetheless be subject to the
exacting strict-scrutiny standard if even a single analogous
nonreligious activity were excepted. Because strict-scrutiny
review is a daunting hurdle for the government to
overcome—famously described as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal
in fact” 16—this new standard would dramatically change
11. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613–14.
12. Id. at 1614.
13. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67–69
(2020) (per curiam); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716,
716–17 (2021); see also Harvest Rock Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 889, 889
(2020); Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 889, 889 (2020).
14. 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 1296.
16. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
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how government may regulate around religious objections.
But a question lingers—is this shift in doctrine qualified
or mitigated by Tandon’s status as a shadow docket case?
After all, the Court has itself observed that summary
affirmances, which are decided with similar procedures to
those that decided Tandon, “have considerably less
precedential value than an opinion on the merits.” 17 And
while on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Kavanaugh
acknowledged the open question of whether a lower court is
“formally bound by . . . Supreme Court stay orders.” 18
Although it is perhaps too early to say with certainty, this
Article explores the question of whether Tandon will be
treated as a lessened or clouded precedent. In doing so, I hope
to provide evidence that will be of use in ongoing debates over
the wisdom of the Court’s current shadow docket practices.
This Article first reviews the growing body of literature
on the until-recently understudied shadow docket and
proceeds to assess the potential significance of Tandon for
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. I then examine the
initial reactions to Tandon by courts and other actors,
finding that some have treated it as a dramatic shift in the
law while others have minimized its significance. I suggest
that Tandon bears many similarities to Bush v. Gore, 19
another per curiam decision with uncertain precedential
status. I conclude by arguing that shadow docket opinions
are difficult for lower courts to apply and poorly suited for
new articulations of the law or alterations of longstanding
doctrine.
I do not contend that any courts have or will ignore the
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But
see generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
17. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180–
81 (1979).
18. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 25 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
19. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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decision, which at a minimum provides a barometer for how
the current Supreme Court will decide future free-exercise
cases. Even in civil-law systems, where stare decisis is not
the rule, lower courts look to the actions of higher courts as
informative, but not controlling. 20 Nothing suggests that
Tandon is not informative in this sense. But I argue instead
that, due to its shadow docket status, some courts will treat
Tandon as something less than a fully binding merits
decision yet something more than a one-off grant of
extraordinary relief to a particular set of parties—a clouded
precedent, much like Bush v. Gore. 21 Others will apply it as
a definitive articulation of Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence. This, in turn, suggests that shadow-docket
decisions introduce an unnecessary level of uncertainty,
confusion, and complexity into the legal system.
I. “UNREASONED, INCONSISTENT, AND IMPOSSIBLE TO
DEFEND”: THE SHADOW DOCKET DRAWS INCREASING
SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court’s non-merits orders have only lately
begun to attract significant attention. As recently as the
1990s, scholars believed that per curiam opinions and nonmerits decisions were declining in significance and
importance. 22 But this trend was reversed by the Roberts
Court, and the importance of the shadow docket has instead
increased at an accelerating rate. 23
The term “shadow docket” was coined in 2015 by
20. See, e.g., Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334
(La. 1978).
21. Cf. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS, II, THE POLITICS OF
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 23 (2008) (“Precedents vary in their legal
vitality, or the extent to which they maintain legal authority.”(citation omitted)).
22. See Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and
Functions, 76 JUDICATURE, no. 1, June–July 1992, at 29, 29.
23. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 1–2 (2015); see also Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant,
140 S. Ct. 3, 6 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Stephen I. Vladeck, The
Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019)).
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Professor William Baude, who argued that the Court’s orders
and summary decisions that “defy its normal procedural
regularity” lack the transparency of its merits cases. 24
Noting problems with “consistency and transparency,”
Baude argued that the Court’s non-merits docket deserves
“attention and possibly reform.” 25 Professor Payvand Ahdout
has also pointed to the shadow docket as an effective and
rapid barometer of the Court’s behavior, given its increasing
prominence. 26
In a forthcoming article, Professor Richard Pierce, Jr.
highlights some problems caused by the implications of the
Court’s grants and denials of stays on the shadow docket. 27
For example, when the Court issues a summary stay of a
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, we “can
make an educated guess that the Supreme Court disagreed
with the district court in some respect, but we have no way
of knowing why.” 28 Pierce warns of the consequences of the
recent “enormous increase” in the use of the shadow docket,
leading to decisions with “massive permanent effects” issued
with only a summary opinion to explain the Court’s
reasoning. 29 Pierce thus questions the shadow docket’s
consistency with the Court’s duty to engage in reasoned
decision-making. 30
Professor Stephen Vladeck has noted and raised
concerns about a dramatic increase in the number of
requests from the Office of the Solicitor General for

24. See Baude, supra note 23, at 1.
25. Id. at 4.
26. See Z. Payvand Ahdout, Direct Collateral Review, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 159,
163 (2021).
27. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court Should Eliminate Its
Lawless Shadow Docket, ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–5),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3888369.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 10.
30. See id. at 13.
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emergency or extraordinary relief from the Court, reflecting
an increasing willingness to use the shadow docket, rather
than traditional procedure, to achieve the government’s
litigation goals. 31 Vladeck explained that this behavior has
been exacerbated by the Court’s receptiveness to it, warning
that shadow-docket decisions can leave “a fog of uncertainty
as to exactly what the standards are in different categories
of cases—a muddle that is as unhelpful to lower courts as it
is to the parties.” 32
An illuminating discussion of the precedential effects of
shadow docket decisions was produced by Judge Trevor
McFadden and Vetan Kapoor. 33 McFadden and Kapoor offer
one of the first analyses of the effect that Supreme Court
grants and denials of stays have on future cases. 34 They
argue that lower courts should examine: (1) whether a stay
was issued by a single justice or the full Court; (2) the type
of underlying merits dispute; and (3) whether the Court
explained its reasoning or expressed a view of the merits. 35
In cases where each of these factors are met, McFadden and
Kapoor argue that lower courts should treat the Supreme
Court order with deference, or at least explain why deference
is unwarranted. 36
Growing scholarly interest in the shadow docket has also
been accompanied by public attention. Vladeck and others
have written media articles criticizing current trends in the
Court’s non-merits docket. 37 Justice Barrett was questioned
31. See Vladeck, supra note 23, at 124.
32. Id. at 157.
33. See generally Trevor N. McFadden & Vetan Kapoor, The Precedential
Effects of the Supreme Court’s Emergency Stays, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827
(2021).
34. See id. at 828.
35. Id. at 849.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, “Shadow Dockets” Are Normal. The Way
SCOTUS Is Using Them Is the Problem., SLATE (Apr. 12, 2021, 6:09 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/scotus-shadow-docket-use-problem
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by Senator Blumenthal about the shadow docket at her
confirmation hearing. 38
the
House
Judiciary
Committee’s
Notably,
Subcommittee on Courts held a hearing on the practice in
February 2021, attracting media attention. 39 In an opening
statement, Democratic Representative Hank Johnson stated
that “transparency is a foundational element of the Supreme
Court’s integrity . . . in most instances, [the Court’s merits
procedure] gives the public months to scrutinize and
understand the significant issues at bar, and their potential
impact.” 40 This is not so with the shadow docket, where
justices “make their decisions based on shorter-than-usual
briefs, without oral arguments and under a tight timeline.” 41
Moreover, the “divisiveness of these decisions seems to have
risen” as well; an “increasing number of emergency decisions
on the shadow docket are decided by a narrow five-four
margin among or along ideological lines.” 42 At the hearing,
concerns about the docket ran across party lines; Republican
Representative Darrell Issa stated that he shared many of
Representative Johnson’s concerns. 43
Notably, one of the strongest recent critiques of the
.html; Lawrence Hurley et al., The ‘Shadow Docket’: How the U.S. Supreme Court
Quietly Dispatches Key Rulings, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2021, 6:29 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-usa-court-shadow-video/the-shadowdocket-how-the-u-s-supreme-court-quietly-dispatches-key-rulings-idUSKBN2B
F16Q; Mark Walsh, The Supreme Court’s ‘Shadow Docket’ Is Drawing Increasing
Scrutiny, ABA J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 9:20 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web
/article/scotus-shadow-docket-draws-increasing-scrutiny.
38. James Romoser, Symposium: Shining a Light on the Shadow Docket,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 22, 2020, 12:15 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10
/symposium-shining-a-light-on-the-shadow-docket/.
39. See Mark Joseph Stern, Congress Finally Scrutinizes One of SCOTUS’s
Most Disturbing Practices, SLATE (Feb. 18, 2021, 6:53 PM), https://slate.com
/news-and-politics/2021/02/supreme-court-shadow-docket-house-hearing.html.
40. House Committee on the Judiciary, The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oC1Vo-MJ9IQ.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Court’s shadow docket practices came from the Supreme
Court itself. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, the Court
declined to enjoin a novel Texas law prohibiting abortions
after six weeks and delegating enforcement to the general
public. 44 Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Breyer
and Sotomayor, using the term “shadow docket” for the first
time in the text of a Supreme Court opinion. 45 She charged
that the
ruling illustrates just how far the Court’s “shadow-docket” decisions
may depart from the usual principles of appellate process. That
ruling . . . is of great consequence. Yet the majority has acted
without any guidance from the Court of Appeals—which is right
now considering the same issues. It has reviewed only the most
cursory party submissions, and then only hastily. And it barely
bothers to explain its conclusion . . . . In all these ways, the
majority’s decision is emblematic of too much of this Court’s
shadow-docket decisionmaking—which every day becomes more
unreasoned, inconsistent, and impossible to defend. 46

The Court’s increasingly active shadow docket has thus
come under fire and has attracted few vocal defenders. But
to date, much of this criticism has turned on the fact that
non-merits orders are usually accompanied by only summary
opinions that shed little light on the Court’s reasoning. 47 An
emergency decision made with a more expansive opinion, as
the Court issued in several COVID-19 cases, raises different
questions. The remainder of this Article will explore what
Tandon reveals about the operation of the shadow docket.

44. 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495–96 (2021).
45. See id. at 2500 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 27, at 3.
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II. “SHOCKWAVES”:
A POTENTIAL FREE-EXERCISE REVOLUTION
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
forbids governmental actions that have “as their object the
suppression of religion,” 48 those demonstrating “hostility
toward . . . sincere religious beliefs,” 49 and those that “impose
special disabilities” based on “religious status.” 50 At the same
time, it “does not mean that religious institutions” or
individuals receive “general immunity from secular laws.” 51
Instead, courts are often faced with the difficult question of
whether the Free Exercise Clause requires government to
exempt people of faith or their institutions from particular
civil obligations that conflict with their religious obligations.
These cases can force courts to weigh interests that are
difficult to balance against each other, such as public health
and religious liberty. As Justice Scalia once noted in another
context, when “interests on both sides are incommensurate,”
balancing them can be like “judging whether a particular line
is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” 52
Questions about the extent to which government should
or must accommodate religious obligations that are
inconsistent with civil laws have arisen since the nation’s
founding, dating back to laws exempting the Quaker
community from Revolutionary-era militia duties and oath
requirements. 53 Although accommodations for the Quakers’
48. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
542 (1993).
49. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Col. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729
(2018).
50. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021
(2017).
51. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060
(2020).
52. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
53. See Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption:
An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916–17 (1992); Ellis M.

2022]

CLOUDED PRECEDENT

99

religious objections were historically granted by legislatures
as a matter of policy, 54 early court decisions rejected the idea
that such claims were constitutionally mandated by freeexercise guarantees, 55 as did subsequent Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 56
Then, in two twentieth-century cases, the Supreme
Court subtly opened the door to the principle that limited
religious exemptions to even neutral and nondiscriminatory
laws may be required by the Free Exercise Clause. In
Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held that a state could not deny
unemployment benefits from a Seventh-Day Adventist
whose beliefs prohibited her from taking a job requiring
working on Saturdays. 57 And in Wisconsin v. Yoder, it held
that a state could not require Amish teenagers to attend
school past the eighth grade in contravention of the

West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of
Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 367, 375 (1993);
William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. RSRV. 357, 376–77, 376 n.95 (1989).
54. See id. at 376 n.95. The framers of the Second Amendment also
considered—but rejected—an explicit religious exemption from compulsory
militia service for religious pacifists. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834); see also Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1083, 1109–16 (2008).
55. See, e.g., Philips v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 416–17 (Pa. 1831); Donahoe v.
Richards, 38 Me. 379, 410–12 (1854); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to
Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591, 629
(1990) (finding “no evidence . . . that the principle of religious freedom was ever
used in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries to justify a right, natural or
constitutional, to be exempt for reasons of religion from a law whose primary
purpose and effect are secular in nature”). But see Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1410, 1411–12 (1990) (arguing that religious exemptions are consistent with
the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause).
56. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879); Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
57. 374 U.S. 398, 399–402 (1963).
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teachings of their faith. 58 These cases applied a demanding
compelling-interest test in reviewing governmental action
and evaluating whether the Free Exercise Clause had been
violated; 59 however, they also made clear that the Free
Exercise Clause does not bar governmental regulation of
substantial threats to public safety, peace, or order,
regardless of religious convictions. 60
The Supreme Court reversed course again in 1990. In the
landmark Employment Division v. Smith, workers who were
discharged for misconduct after using peyote in a religious
ceremony challenged the denial of their unemployment
benefits on free-exercise grounds. 61 In an opinion penned by
Justice Scalia, the Court held that “the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with
a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” 62 Under Smith, Free
Exercise Clause challenges against neutral laws of general
applicability are thus examined under a lenient rationalbasis standard of review, which requires only that the
challenged law be rationally related to a legitimate

58. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 228–29 (1972).
59. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (establishing
that the purpose of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act was to “restore
the compelling interest test as set forth” in Sherbert and Yoder), held
unconstitutional in part by Boerne, 521 U.S. at 543. The compelling-interest test
requires the government to show that its challenged action is “necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.” E.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982). It is thus significantly more difficult for the government to prevail
under that test than under the rational basis test, see supra note 7 and
accompanying text, although the regime imposed by Sherbert and Yoder was not
insurmountable. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (denying
religious exemption from Social Security taxes post-Yoder).
60. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230 & n.20.
61. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874–76
(1990).
62. Id. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3).
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governmental interest. 63 Only laws that single out religion
for discriminatory treatment, and accordingly are not
neutral or generally applicable, trigger heightened review. 64
Smith was immediately controversial, 65 and an early test
of its new standard came three years later. In Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, practitioners of
Santeria challenged a law forbidding animal sacrifices. 66
There, the Court held that the law, supposedly targeting
animal cruelty, was not generally applicable—and thus did
not benefit from Smith’s forgiving standard of review—
because it was riddled with a pattern of exceptions for
secular conduct demonstrating that it impermissibly
targeted a disfavored religion. 67 The Court noted that the
city had purportedly acted to ban the unnecessary killing of
animals, but continued to allow, among other things,
63. See id.; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 531 (1993); see also S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140
S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of injunctive
application), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.);
see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
64. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32.
65. Congress responded to the decision by enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which provides that governmental action may not
substantially burden a person’s religious exercise unless that action withstands
a heightened compelling-interest test. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The RFRA thus
“restored” via statute the more exacting level of judicial scrutiny that had been
applied in the earlier Sherbert and Yoder decisions. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403;
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court
subsequently held that RFRA’s intended application to the states exceeded
Congress’s enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
521 U.S. 507, 530–36 (1997), but the statute continues to apply in challenges to
actions taken by the federal government. See, e.g., Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d
1210, 1220–22 (9th Cir. 2002). Many states have also enacted their own RFRA
analogues that largely track the federal statute. See, e.g., Diggs v. Snyder, 775
N.E.2d 40, 44–45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (deciding pursuant to Illinois RFRA, 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1–99 (2021)); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448
P.3d 890, 919 (Ariz. 2019) (deciding pursuant to Arizona Free Exercise of Religion
Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1493 to 41-1493.02 (2021)); Barr v. City of Sinton, 295
S.W.3d 287, 296 (Tex. 2009) (deciding pursuant to Texas RFRA, TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001–110.012 (West 2021)).
66. 508 U.S. at 524–25.
67. Id. at 543–44.
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hunting, fishing, the extermination of pests, the use of live
animals as bait, euthanasia of unwanted animals, and the
killing of animals for medical science. 68 This pattern of
exceptions for analogous secular conduct showed that the
law’s purported concern with the lives of animals was mere
pretext, masking impermissible animus toward a specific
religious practice. 69
Lukumi therefore explained that a law excepting a
pattern of secular activities while banning comparable
religious ones is not neutral and generally applicable, and
thus does not benefit from rational-basis review under
Smith. 70 The Free Exercise Clause guards against such
“religious gerrymanders.” 71 Lukumi did not, however,
pronounce that a single secular exception from a law would
automatically trigger heightened review, or that all religious
activities must necessarily be treated at least as well as any
single comparable secular activity. 72
That later approach was suggested by Professors
68. Id. A potential critique of the Court’s reasoning is that it seems to conflate
all animal species, despite vast differences between them, in terms of intelligence,
capacity to experience pain, and potential nuisance and health risks to humans.
Is the killing of a rat in one’s home truly a valid comparison to the killing of, for
example, a chicken during a religious sacrifice? Raising a similar question, James
Oleske Jr. has asked whether, under the logic of the case, “the federal
government [must] make an exemption for the religious sacrifice of dolphins
simply because it does not ban the boiling of lobsters?” James M. Oleske, Jr.,
Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and Animal
Welfare Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. 295, 321 (2013).
69. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 545.
70. See id. at 546.
71. Id. at 534 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
72. See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1082 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The
mere existence of” a single “secular exemption” does not “automatically create[]
a claim for a religious exemption.” (quoting Grace United Methodist Church v.
City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 651 (10th Cir. 2006))); Lighthouse Inst. for
Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A
regulation does not automatically cease being neutral and generally applicable
. . . simply because it allows certain secular behaviors but not certain religious
behaviors.”).
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Douglas Laycock and Steven Collis in a 2016 article, which
argued that the “constitutional right to free exercise of
religion is a right to be treated like the most favored
analogous secular conduct.” 73 Justice Kavanaugh later
articulated this “most favored” right approach in dissent in
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, one of the first
phase of COVID-19 cases decided against the plaintiffs
before Justice Barrett reached the Court: “[T]he First
Amendment requires that religious organizations be treated
equally to the favored or exempt secular organizations,
unless the State can sufficiently justify the differentiation.” 74
But, in Sisolak, Kavanaugh was joined by no other justice. 75
Put simply, under the traditional interpretation of the Smith
standard, rational-basis review did not necessarily hinge on
whether any single secular comparator was excepted from a
rule while any single religious comparator was not. 76
Heightened review was instead triggered in cases like
Lukumi, where a pervasive pattern of exceptions
demonstrated a “religious gerrymander” and thus a lack of
neutrality and general applicability. 77
That was, until Tandon. There, the Court ordered
emergency injunctive relief on behalf of a plaintiff religious
organization against California’s pandemic restrictions on
the size of gatherings. 78 Five Justices issued an unsigned,

73. See Douglas Laycock & Stevens T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and
the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2016).
74. 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). In Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence similarly stated
that, “once a State creates a favored class of businesses, . . . the State must justify
why houses of worship are excluded from that favored class.” Roman Cath.
Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,141 S. Ct. 63, 73 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring).
But again, his concurrence was joined by no other justice.
75. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2609 (2020).
76. See Stormans, Inc., 794 F.3d at 1082; Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, 510
F.3d at 265.
77. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
78. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
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per curiam opinion. 79 That opinion included one potentially
revolutionary statement, closely mirroring Justice
Kavanaugh’s most-favored-right position in Sisolak:
“[G]overnment regulations are not neutral and generally
applicable, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny under the
Free Exercise Clause, whenever they treat any comparable
secular activity more favorably than religious exercise.” 80
Chief Justice Roberts would have denied the plaintiff’s
application, and Justice Kagan, joined by justices Breyer and
Sotomayor, dissented. 81 Perhaps obliquely criticizing the
majority for issuing a sweeping articulation of the law in an
unsigned opinion, Justice Kagan’s dissent mentioned the
opinion’s status as a per curiam six times in just three
paragraphs. 82 She closed by replacing her typical “I
respectfully dissent” 83 with “I respectfully dissent from this
latest per curiam decision.” 84 Months later, she would more
directly criticize the Court’s shadow-docket practices in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson. 85
The potential ramifications of the per curiam’s mostfavored-right principle are startling. Virtually all laws and
regulations include at least some exceptions. 86 COVID-19
public-health orders initially limited most voluntary public
79. See id. at 1296, 1298.
80. Id. at 1296.
81. Id. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1298–99 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716,
723 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
140 S. Ct. 2183, 2245 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 169 (2011) (Kagan,
J., dissenting); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 638 (2014) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
84. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1299 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
85. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2500 (2021)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
86. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1540 (1999) (“[V]irtually all laws . . . contain many secular
exemptions.”).
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gatherings, but they did not limit the capacity of grocery
stores. 87 Public-school vaccine mandates exempt those with
medical conditions that are contraindications to
immunization. 88 The employment-discrimination provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not apply to employers with
fewer than fifteen employees. 89 State laws that protect the
public from discrimination on the basis of protected
categories include exceptions allowing businesses to refuse
to serve those under the age of eighteen. 90 The nation’s draft
exempts women. 91 And so on, and so forth.
Do these types of routine exceptions for nonreligious
groups or activities automatically entitle religious objectors
to strict-scrutiny review of the government’s actions? If so,
Smith’s presumption that free-exercise cases are by default
reviewed under a rational-basis standard is all but dead.
Indeed, if so, it was unnecessary of the Court to outline the
litany of secular exceptions to the animal-cruelty law in
Lukumi 92 and to discuss religious gerrymanders; heightened
review would have been triggered merely because the state
had barred religious animal sacrifices while continuing to
allow recreational hunting. 93
The initial scholarly reaction to Tandon generally agrees
that the decision has dramatic implications. Professor
Michael Helfand described the Court’s language as
“somewhat slippery” but explained that, “given the frequency
with which laws have exceptions, such an approach would go

87. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief).
88. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120372 (West 2021).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
90. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3904(D) (2021).
91. See Nat’l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 141 S. Ct. 1815, 1816 (2021)
(statement of Sotomayor, J.).
92. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
543–44 (1993).
93. See id.
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quite far in transforming the religious discrimination
paradigm . . . provid[ing] a basis for deeming laws not
neutral in cases where any secular conduct was granted
favorable treatment.” 94 Professor Josh Blackman likewise
views Tandon as “formally adopt[ing] Justice Kavanaugh’s
‘most favored’ right framework.” 95 Professor Scott Gaylord
wrote that the decision “sent shockwaves through the Court’s
Free Exercise jurisprudence.” 96 And Professor R. George
Wright described the opinion as of “disproportionately great
and sustained interest” given its transformation of freeexercise doctrine. 97
The question, then, is whether Tandon’s most-favored
right principle will gain full-throated acceptance by lower
courts. It is, of course, a decision of the Supreme Court and
thus impossible to ignore. But not all precedents are created
equal. 98 In the past the Court has cautioned that summary
affirmances, decided with similar procedures to those in
Tandon, “have considerably less precedential value than an
opinion on the merits.” 99 And in other cases, circuit judges
have grappled with the question of whether the Court’s non-

94. Michael Helfand, First 100 Days Symposium, Religious Liberty and
Religious Discrimination: Where is the Supreme Court Headed?, 2021 U. ILL. L.
REV. ONLINE 98, 103 https://www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021
/04/Helfand.pdf.
95. Josh Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause, 44 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 637, 647 (2021).
96. Scott W. Gaylord, Neutrality Without a Tape Measure: Accommodating
Religion After American Legion, 19 AVE MARIA L. REV. 25, 56 (2021).
97. R. George Wright, Free Exercise and the Public Interest After Tandon v.
Newsom, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE, Spring, 189, at 189 https://www
.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Wright.pdf. Wright further
notes the decision’s status as “a temporary per curiam shadow docket order, by a
bare voting majority, reviewing a lower court’s denial of an injunction pending
appeal.” Id. at 189 n.2.
98. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 21, at 23; see also supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
99. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180–
81 (1979).
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merits decisions are entitled to controlling weight. 100 The
response of courts to Tandon will be instructive as to the true
impact of the Court’s shadow docket.
III. TANDON IN THE COURTS
The initial response to Tandon has been uneven and
chaotic. Some have contended that the case now defines the
appropriate standard for reviewing Free Exercise Clause
challenges. 101 Others have minimized its significance or
simply grouped it together with the other COVID-19 cases
decided on the Court’s shadow docket. In this section, I
review early decisions interpreting Tandon with an eye
toward evaluating whether it is being treated as the
equivalent of a merits decision.
A. Silence in Fulton
The Supreme Court had an early opportunity to reiterate
Tandon’s most-favored-right language in a traditional merits
decision, or at least to signal to lower courts that Tandon is
entitled to full precedential status. 102 The majority declined
to do so.
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia involved a dispute
between a Catholic foster-care agency and the city, which
declined to renew the agency’s contract unless it would agree
to certify LGBTQ couples as potential foster parents. 103 The
agency argued that the city had violated its free-exercise
100. See CASA de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 229–30 (4th Cir. 2020); id.
at 281 n.16 (King, J., dissenting); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
101. This group, naturally, includes litigants bringing free-exercise cases.
Many litigants quickly filed notices of supplemental authority arguing that
Tandon established the rule that religious entities are entitled to strict scrutiny
where any comparable secular entity has received better treatment. See, e.g.,
Little Sisters’ Notice of Supplemental Authority at 2, California v. Azar, No. 17cv-5783 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2021), ECF No. 458.
102. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 21, at 16, 111.
103. 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1875–76 (2021).
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rights, and that the ordinance the city acted under was not
neutral or generally applicable. 104
Fulton—which was fully briefed and argued months
before Tandon even reached the Court 105—stood to
potentially remake the Court’s Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence, in part because the petitioners asked the
Court to formally overrule Smith. 106 But by the time Fulton
was decided, the significance of Smith had perhaps been
eroded by the per curiam opinion in Tandon, causing some
commentators to observe that Tandon had stolen Fulton’s
thunder. 107 Because the Fulton plaintiffs argued, and the
Court ultimately held, that the city’s procedure for fostercare contracts was not neutral and generally applicable
because it “incorporate[d] a system of individual
exemptions,” 108 the Court had ample opportunity to cite
Tandon and reiterate or clarify its most-favored-right
approach.
But the majority did not. Instead, in the unanimous
opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts (who would have
denied the application in Tandon), 109 Tandon was not cited
a single time. 110 Nor was it cited in the concurrence of Justice
Barrett, joined by Justice Kavanaugh and in part by Justice
Breyer, which explained why those justices declined to
overturn Smith. 111 Tandon was instead cited only in the
concurrence of Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Alito and

104. See id. at 1876.
105. See id. at 1868.
106. Id. at 1876.
107. Jim Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder: The Most Important Free
Exercise Decision Since 1990, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2020, 10:13 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/04/tandon-steals-fultons-thunder-the-mostimportant-free-exercise-decision-since-1990/.
108. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878.
109. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1254, 1298 (2021).
110. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1874–82.
111. See id. at 1882–1883 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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Thomas, which criticized the majority for failing to overturn
Smith. 112 Gorsuch cited Tandon to state that “[e]xceptions
for one means strict scrutiny for all,” reiterating the mostfavored-right approach. 113 He also stated that Tandon
“began to resolve at least some of the confusion surrounding
Smith’s application,” 114 implying that the per curiam opinion
should have precedential effect.
But what are we to make of the majority’s failure to even
mention Tandon in its discussion of exceptions? 115 In a
decision where the majority devoted paragraphs to
explaining
the
Court’s
Free
Exercise
Clause
jurisprudence, 116 citing major cases like Smith, 117
Lukumi, 118 Sherbert, 119 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 120 and Bowen v. Roy, 121
the absence of any mention of Tandon is noticeable 122—if we
assume that the shadow docket decision has a status
equivalent to those venerable merits opinions.
On the other hand, if we assume that a per curiam
112. Id. at 1929–31 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 1929.
114. Id. at 1930.
115. For a general discussion of the significance of discretionary citation of
precedents, see Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An
Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 527–28.
116. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1876–77.
117. Id. passim (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990)).
118. Id. at 1877, 1881, 1882 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
119. Id. at 1877, 1881, 1882 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
120. Id. at 1877, 1882 (citing 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)).
121. Id. at 1877 (citing 476 U.S. 693 (1986)).
122. Empirically, courts tend to cite more recent precedents when possible, and
“it is well established that older cases are generally less likely to be cited.” Ryan
C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme
Court Precedent, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (2013). Thus, the Court’s
decision to cite older Free Exercise cases without mentioning Tandon during its
general explication of free-exercise jurisprudence is notable.
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shadow docket opinion creates something less than full,
controlling precedent, 123 the majority’s decision to not
mention Tandon, even when discussing exceptions and
general applicability, is less surprising. 124 But this
interpretation leaves the lower courts with a difficult
question: what to do with Tandon?
B. The Lower Courts Respond 125
1. The Western District of Washington
One of the first district court decisions interpreting
Tandon was Chung v. Washington Interscholastic Activities
Ass’n, a free-exercise challenge by Seventh-Day Adventist
student athletes who charged that the state had failed to
accommodate their Sabbath observation when scheduling
tournaments. 126 The plaintiffs argued that the defendant
athletic association had accommodated secular concerns in
its scheduling decisions but not religious ones, citing first to
the Court’s pre-Tandon COVID-19 cases and then filing a
notice of supplemental authority after Tandon was
decided. 127
The Western District of Washington held that the
Supreme Court’s line of COVID-19 cases was inapplicable. 128
It read two pre-Tandon COVID cases—Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo 129 and a Ninth Circuit decision
applying
Roman
Catholic
Diocese
of
Brooklyn’s

123. See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 180–81 (1979).
124. Precedents that are not incorporated into later decisions lack “power in
directing the path of the law.” Cross et al., supra note 115, at 518–19.
125. Due to the publishing schedule for this article, the following discussion
covers decisions issued through October 2021 only.
126. 538 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1175–77 (W.D. Wash. 2021).
127. Id. at 1184 & n.3.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1184 (citing 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam)).
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reasoning 130—as simply enjoining laws that singled out
religious activities for especially harsh treatment. 131
Surprisingly, the court held that Tandon was inapplicable
“[f]or the same reasons.” 132 The Chung court did not discuss
Tandon’s statement that “regulations . . . trigger strict
scrutiny . . . whenever they treat any comparable secular
activity more favorably than religious exercise.” 133 Instead,
it determined that rational-basis review applied under
Smith, and the court held that the defendant’s application of
its rules survived. 134
Perhaps surprised by the court’s failure to address
Tandon’s most-favored-right principle, the Chung plaintiffs
filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing among other
things “manifest error in the [c]ourt’s legal analysis of
Tandon v. Newsom.” 135 But on reconsideration, the court
found no error in its previous opinion, emphasizing that the
California public-health order enjoined by Tandon had
subjected “hair salons, retail stores, personal care services,
movie theaters, private suites at sporting events and
concerts, and indoor restaurants” to operate under a more
lenient standard than religious services. 136 It then noted that
the Tandon majority criticized California’s COVID-19
regulations as containing “myriad exceptions and
accommodations for comparable activities.” 137 Drawing from
this statement, the Chung court held that, because the
challenged Washington athletic scheduling rules did not

130. Id. (citing Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 982 F.3d 1228 (9th
Cir. 2020)).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 1184 n.3.
133. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1254, 1296 (2021) (emphasis in original).
134. Chung, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 1188–89.
135. Chung v. Wash. Interscholastic Activities Ass’n., No. 19-CV-5730, 2021
WL 3129624, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2021).
136. Id. at *3.
137. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1297).
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contain “myriad exceptions” for secular activities, Tandon
was inapplicable. 138
The focus on whether there were “myriad exceptions” is
difficult to reconcile with Tandon’s most-favored-right
language. The Chung court essentially ignored Tandon’s
implication that religion must be treated at least as
favorably as “any comparable secular activity.” 139 Instead, by
holding that strict scrutiny is triggered by the presence of
“myriad exceptions,” the court applied what had been
longstanding law under Lukumi. 140 Interestingly, the Chung
court explicitly noted that in Fulton, the Court only “cited
[Tandon] in one concurrence that disagreed with the
majority’s decision to avoid addressing Smith.” 141
Neither Chung opinion expressly discounted Tandon on
the ground that the case was a shadow docket decision. But
the court twice ignored Tandon’s language that strict
scrutiny is triggered when “any comparable secular
activity” 142 is excepted, applying instead the older precedent
that patterns of non-neutral exemptions constitute
impermissible “religious gerrymanders.” 143 In effect, the
Chung court appears to have not viewed Tandon as
significantly revising free-exercise doctrine. And its
reference to the Supreme Court’s near silence in Fulton can
perhaps be read as questioning whether the Court intended
Tandon’s per curiam opinion to stand alone as controlling
precedent.

138. Id. at *3.
139. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296.
140. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 544 (1993).
141. Chung, 2021 WL 3129624, at *4.
142. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296 (emphasis in original).
143. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S.
664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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2. The Northern District of Illinois
Other courts have also grouped Tandon together with
the Supreme Court’s other COVID-19 shadow-docket
decisions, without acknowledging the fact that those cases
did not articulate a change in free-exercise doctrine, while
Tandon did. For example, considering a COVID-19 case on
remand, the Northern District of Illinois considered South
Bay United Pentecostal Church, 144 Roman Catholic Diocese
of Brooklyn, 145 and Tandon together, stating that in each of
these the Supreme Court was persuaded that the plaintiffs
were likely to succeed “because the COVID-19 orders were
not narrowly tailored and discriminated against religion.” 146
The court explained that New York’s COVID-19 order could
be viewed as targeting the ultra-Orthodox community and
thus discriminating against religion and then stated that the
“same concerns also permeate the opinion in Tandon.” 147
The court thus viewed these three shadow docket
decisions as together standing for the non-controversial
proposition that government may not discriminate against
religion through religious gerrymanders—a principle that
was long ago enshrined by Lukumi. 148 It did not, however,
parse these individual shadow docket opinions to identify
new articulations of Free Exercise Clause doctrine. This
approach suggests that the Court’s disposition of cases on its
shadow docket indicates whether relief should be granted to
similar parties in analogous cases, but its statements in
shadow docket per curiam opinions are not necessarily taken
as definitive articulations of the law.

144. Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20 C 2782, 2021 WL
3142111, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2021) (citing S. Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021)).
145. Id. (citing Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63
(2021)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
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3. The District of New Jersey
Two New Jersey churches challenged the state’s expired
COVID-19 gathering locations in Solid Rock Baptist Church
v. Murphy. 149 The plaintiffs filed a notice of supplemental
authority after Tandon was issued, arguing that the decision
“mandates a strict scrutiny analysis of government
restrictions involving religious matters by lower courts.” 150
Although the court requested supplemental briefing on the
effect of Tandon, it did not substantively discuss the decision
in its opinion, holding instead that the plaintiffs’ challenge
was moot and warranted Younger abstention. 151
4. The Northern District of Texas
Perhaps the most expansive early interpretation of
Tandon by a district court came in a lawsuit by a church and
a religious business seeking a free-exercise exemption from
anti-discrimination policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 “so that they may hire and fire in accordance with
sincerely held religious beliefs and employment policies.” 152
The Northern District of Texas noted the existence of several
secular exemptions in Title VII, such as a specific exclusion
allowing employers to fire members of communist-affiliated
organizations. 153 Adopting an expansive reading of Tandon,
and citing the per curiam decision extensively, the court held
that, since the government extends “these exemptions to
nonreligious decisions, they must treat requests for religious
exemptions the same.” 154

149. Civ. No. 20-6805, 2021 WL 3630289, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2021).
150. Id. at *2.
151. See id. at *2–6.
152. Bear Creek Bible Church v. EEOC, No. 18-CV-00824, 2021 WL 5052661,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2021), amended by 2021 WL 5449038 (N.D. Tex. Nov.
22, 2021).
153. See id. at *25.
154. Id.
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5. The District of Maine
On the other hand, the District of Maine rejected the
strongest possible interpretation of Tandon in a free-exercise
challenge brought by healthcare providers against a vaccine
mandate. 155 The plaintiffs argued that Maine’s vaccine
mandate impermissibly allowed medical exemptions (for
those likely to suffer adverse effects from the vaccine) while
not recognizing religious exemptions. 156 But the court held
that a “crucial” aspect of Tandon is focusing only on
“comparable” activities, and it rejected the argument that
medical and religious exemptions are comparable. 157 The
decision was affirmed by the First Circuit. 158 Its reasoning
stands in sharp contrast to the Northern District of Texas’s
reading of Tandon—if medical contraindications were not
“comparable” to requests for religious vaccine exemptions in
Maine, it is not obvious why Title VII’s exemptions for
measures taken against members of communist
organizations should be deemed comparable to requests for
religious exemptions for nondiscrimination policies in Texas.
But the cloud of uncertainty around Tandon was only
increased when the Maine plaintiffs sought emergency relief
from the Supreme Court. Although the Court denied the
application, Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Kavanaugh,
wrote separately to emphasize that they were making a
“discretionary judgment about whether the Court should
grant review” rather than an assessment of the merits. 159
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito,
dissented and explicitly rejected the district court’s moderate

155. See Does 1–6 v. Mills, No. 21-CV-00242, 2021 WL 4783626, at *1, *8 (D.
Me. Oct. 13), aff’d, 16 F.4th 20 (1st Cir.), application for injunctive relief denied
sub nom. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17 (2021).
156. See id. at *8, *12.
157. See id. at *8.
158. Does 1–6, 16 F.4th at 37.
159. Does 1–3, 142 S. Ct. at 18 (Barrett, J., concurring in denial of application
for injunctive relief).
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interpretation of Tandon. 160
6. The Sixth Circuit
Tandon was addressed by the Sixth Circuit in a
challenge brought by a religious private school and two
parents who contended that a mask mandate that applied to
public and private schools violated their religious beliefs. 161
The court addressed Tandon’s most-favored-right principle
without implying that its shadow docket status was
relevant. 162 However, the court held that no comparator
besides other schools was appropriate, and it upheld the
mask requirement even under Tandon, as all schools in the
state were treated the same. 163
7. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit addressed Tandon in a challenge to
an expired COVID-19 public health order. 164 Discussing the
course of COVID-19 free-exercise litigation, the court
explained that, at the beginning of the pandemic,
[w]hile it was generally understood that churches hosting religious
services could not be treated less favorably than other venues that
held gatherings of large groups of people in close proximity for
extended periods of time, the contours of this neutrality principle
were not well defined. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). What constitutes a ‘comparable
secular activity’ that may be treated no more favorably than
religious activity has divided the Supreme Court, but the Court has
now ruled that the relevant comparison extends beyond movie
theaters and lecture halls to hardware stores, hair salons,
acupuncture facilities, and garages. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1297;
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 66. 165

160. See id. at 18–19 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
161. See Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel, 11 F.4th 437, 441, 450–51, rehearing en
banc granted, vacated, 16 F.4th 1215 (6th Cir. 2021) (mem.).
162. See id. at 457–58.
163. See id. at 448, 457–58, 460.
164. Hawse v. Page, 7 F.4th 685, 687 (8th Cir. 2021).
165. Id. at 693.
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Again, the court seemed to treat the COVID-19 shadowdocket cases as a set, rather than treating Tandon as a
watershed opinion with implications extending well beyond
those of Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn or South Bay
United Pentecostal Church. And again, the court discussed
exceptions for comparable secular activity without
mentioning the most-favored-right doctrine that Tandon
seems to assert.
8. The Ninth Circuit
Another instructive decision was Foothill Church v.
Watanabe, a post-Tandon Free Exercise Clause decision that
did not mention Tandon at all. 166 In Foothill Church, houses
of worship contended a requirement that they offer
employees group health plans that would cover elective
abortions violated their Free Exercise Clause rights. 167 The
plaintiffs argued that strict scrutiny was triggered in part
because the relevant government officials had discretion to
offer exemptions from the requirement for “good cause,” 168
and had in fact allowed at least one exemption to another
entity. 169
While Tandon’s most-favored-right concept, which would
dramatically expand the range of situations in which
exemptions trigger strict scrutiny, would seem at least
relevant to these arguments, the Ninth Circuit panel did not
discuss it. Instead, the panel vacated the district court’s
ruling and remanded for further consideration in light of
Fulton—but not Tandon. 170 The exclusion of Tandon from
the remand order, despite the fact that Tandon seemingly
166. See Foothill Church v. Watanabe, 3 F.4th 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) (vacating
and remanding district court decision on plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause claim);
see also Foothill Church v. Watanabe, 854 F. App’x 174 (9th Cir. 2021)
(dismissing plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim).
167. 3 F.4th at 1201 (Bress, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 1204.
169. Id. at 1206.
170. See id. at 1201.
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altered Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence far more
dramatically than Fulton did, is striking. Judge Bress
dissented from the decision, arguing that remand was
unnecessary because the case was clear under pre-Fulton
precedent, but he did not mention Tandon either. 171
9. The Tenth Circuit
A more substantial early discussion of Tandon came in
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, a case challenging a Colorado law
that forbade public accommodations to discriminate on the
basis of protected categories, including sexual orientation. 172
A website-design company, with owners whose religious
beliefs prohibited designing websites for the weddings of
same-sex couples, argued that the law violated its speech and
free-exercise rights. 173 The plaintiffs argued that secular
speakers had been treated better than religious speakers,
triggering strict scrutiny, but the panel held that there was
no evidence that any secular speakers had been permitted to
discriminate against LGBTQ customers. 174 The panel cited
both Fulton and Tandon, without qualifying Tandon’s status
as a shadow-docket opinion. 175 Yet the majority opinion did
not mention Tandon’s most-favored-right concept when
articulating the standard for demonstrating that a law is not
generally applicable. 176
In contrast, the most-favored-right principle was
squarely addressed in a dissent by Judge Tymkovich, who
quoted from Tandon and argued that the Colorado statute
allowed ad-hoc exceptions and thus triggered strict

171. See id. at 1201–07.
172. 6 F.4th 1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 2021).
173. Id. at 1169–70. The challenged Colorado antidiscrimination regime was
the same that had been challenged in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1725 (2018).
174. 303 Creative LLC , 6 F.4th at 1185–86.
175. See id.
176. See id.
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scrutiny. 177 303 Creative thus demonstrates a possible split,
with one judge viewing Tandon’s most-favored right
principle as potentially deciding the case, and with the other
two panel members citing the case generally but not
addressing its articulation of the most-favored-right
principle.
A different Tenth Circuit panel cited Tandon a single
time in its summary of free-exercise law in a Section 1983
case brought by a Muslim inmate against a corrections
officer. 178 The court cited Tandon along with Lukumi for the
proposition that a law that is not neutral or generally
applicable must satisfy a compelling-interest test. 179 Thus,
the court appeared to recognize Tandon as a significant freeexercise decision worthy of citation, but it did not reference
or elaborate on Tandon’s most-favored-right principle.
*

*

*

In conclusion, among the early post-Tandon Free
Exercise Clause decisions, one panel ignored the case,
focusing entirely on Fulton; 180 another treated it as
controlling free-exercise law; 181 two other majority opinions
discussed it generally without mentioning its most-favoredright concept; 182 one dissent squarely addressed the mostfavored-right concept and would have found it determinative
of the case before him; 183 one district court applied the
strongest form of the most-favored-right concept; 184 another
177. Id. at 1206–09 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
178. See Ashaheed v. Currington, 7 F.4th 1236, 1240–41, 1243 (10th Cir. 2021).
179. See id.
180. See Foothill Church v. Watanabe, 3 F.4th 1201, 1201 (9th Cir. 2021).
181. See Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel, 11 F.4th 437, 457–58 (6th Cir. 2021).
182. See 303 Creative LLC, 6 F.4th at 1186; Hawse v. Page, 7 F.4th 685, 692–
93 (8th Cir. 2021).
183. 303 Creative LLC, 6 F.4th at 1206–09 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
184. See Bear Creek Bible Church v. EEOC, No. 18-CV-00824, 2021 WL
5052661, at *25–26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2021).
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did not; 185 another treated Tandon as interchangeable with
the other shadow-docket COVID-19 cases; 186 and a final
district court considered Tandon in two opinions but read it
as applying when “myriad exceptions” are present,
essentially repudiating the most-favored-right concept. 187 In
short, the early application of Tandon has been uneven and
chaotic.
While this cannot be conclusively or completely tied to
its status as a shadow docket decision, a statement of the law
in a traditional merits opinion would have sent a clearer
signal to the lower courts, and may have resulted in more
uniform interpretation. Moreover, because the Court’s
positive treatment of its own precedents in subsequent
merits opinions tends to increase the rate at which lower
courts comply with and cite those precedents, 188 the Fulton
majority’s decision to not cite Tandon potentially contributed
to its uneven application in early lower-court opinions.
IV. A NEW BUSH V. GORE
There is a particular irony to Tandon being issued as a
per curiam opinion (literally, “by the court”), because the
case was a divisive opinion decided by a bare five-to-four
majority. While the practice of issuing per curiam decisions
was initially adopted in part to demonstrate the consensus
and unanimity of the Supreme Court with respect to
particular legal issues, over the course of the twentieth
century, it became more common for justices to dissent from
them. 189 In later years, particularly during the Burger Court,
185. See Does 1–6 v. Mills, No. 21-CV-00242, 2021 WL 4783626, at *8 (D. Me.
Oct. 13), aff’d, 16 F.4th 20 (1st Cir.), application for injunctive relief denied sub
nom. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17 (2021).
186. Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20 C 2782, 2021 WL
3142111, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2021), aff’d, 22 F.4th 701 (7th Cir. 2022).
187. Chung v. Wash. Interscholastic Activities Ass’n, No. C19-5730, 2021 WL
3129624, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2021).
188. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 21, at 117.
189. See Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the
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the per curiam opinion was occasionally used “to resolve
high-profile cases which raised difficult and controversial
issues on which the Justices held widely divergent
positions.” 190 But Tandon fits neither model. Far from
reflecting a unanimous Court acting together on a matter of
consensus, the case was decided five to four, reaching the
opposite result, due to the replacement of a Justice, as the
Court reached in a virtually identical case mere months
before. 191 And instead of avoiding difficult and controversial
issues, the opinion appears to articulate with specificity a
contested new doctrine for Free Exercise Clause cases.
But Tandon is not the first case of dramatic significance
decided in a per curiam opinion by a bare majority—in that
respect, it follows in the footsteps of Bush v. Gore, 192 perhaps
the most significant unsigned opinion in the Court’s
history. 193 While not technically a shadow docket case—Bush
v. Gore began as a request for an emergency stay, but the
Court both granted the stay and treated it as a petition for
certiorari, which it also granted, moving the case to the
Court’s merits docket 194—it bore many hallmarks of modern
shadow docket decisions. That case was extremely rushed,
with certiorari granted on December 9, oral argument set for
December 11 at 11:00 a.m., and a final decision issued
shortly before midnight on December 12. 195 Briefs were filed
simultaneously, depriving the parties of the ability to review

Supreme Court’s Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 524–30
(2000).
190. Id. at 536.
191. Compare Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296, 1298 (2021) (per
curiam), with S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613,
1613–14 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive
relief), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.).
192. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
193. See Ray, supra note 189, at 575.
194. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000).
195. See id.; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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and carefully respond to each other’s arguments. 196 In his
dissent against the Court’s injunction against the election
recount, Justice Stevens lamented that “[t]ime does not
permit a full discussion of the merits.” 197 Like the emergency
COVID-19 cases, Bush v. Gore was decided using
extraordinary procedures poorly suited to reasoned
deliberation and careful articulation of the law.
And as it did in Tandon, the Bush v. Gore Court issued
an unsigned, per curiam opinion over the strident objections
of nearly half its members. Attempting to explain the Court’s
decision to issue a per curiam opinion in a case that decided
a presidential election, Laura Ray wrote that:
By suggesting that the opinion comes from the Court rather than
from an identified Justice, the per curiam assumes institutional
authority and attempts, with limited success, to underplay the
serious division reflected by the vote and the separate opinions. The
per curiam also suggests an opinion of modest intentions, useful to
a Court that insists at the same time on identifying a new
constitutional right and limiting its application. Most dramatically,
the per curiam seems intended to support the Court’s assertion
that, far from engaging in judicial activism in resolving the
presidential election, it is in fact only reluctantly entering the fray
to fulfill its constitutional role. 198

These considerations may have played a role in the
majority’s decision to issue a per curiam opinion in Tandon
as well, with the crisis of a global pandemic replacing the
crisis of a disputed presidential election.
If aspects of Tandon indeed mirror Bush v. Gore, what
are the implications for Tandon’s acceptance by courts and
other actors? Whether Bush v. Gore had articulated “a rule
good for one case and one case only” was a hotly debated
question in the decision’s aftermath. 199 But the evolution of
196. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 1046.
197. Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Ray, supra note 189, at 575.
199. See Chad Flanders, Please Don’t Cite This Case! The Precedential Value
of Bush v. Gore, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141, 143 (2006), http://yalelawjournal
.org/forum/please-dona8217t-cite-this-case-the-precedential-value-of-bush-v-
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the law has been more complicated than many expected—
some lower courts have applied Bush v. Gore as a fully
precedential opinion; indeed, the en banc Ninth Circuit
described it as “the leading case on disputed elections.” 200
But this is far from a unanimous view. A later Ninth Circuit
panel held that the precedential value of Bush v. Gore was
limited, 201 and multiple district courts have stated that its
precedential value is unclear. 202 In a dissent, Judge Gilman
of the Sixth Circuit contended that the case was “murky” and
its “precedential value” was “at best questionable.” 203 Other
judges have taken a middle path, asserting that Bush v. Gore
“was a narrow holding that specifically dealt with legal
challenges arising from a presidential election” and limiting
it to those circumstances. 204
Notably, the Supreme Court itself has scrupulously
avoided the case. In over twenty years, the per curiam
opinion appears in only one Supreme Court merits decision,
cited in a footnote to a dissent by Justice Thomas. 205 Justice
Rehnquist’s Bush v. Gore concurrence has been cited twice
more, both times in dissents or concurrences from shadow
gore; see also Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (describing Bush v. Gore as a dormant constitutional
precedent).
200. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc).
201. Rodriguez v. Newsom, 974 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 2754 (2021).
202. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott, 369 F. Supp. 3d 768,
780 (W.D. Tex. 2019), aff’d, 951 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2020); Lyman v. Baker, 352 F.
Supp. 3d 81, 87 (D. Mass. 2018), aff’d, 954 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 2020).
203. Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 880, 886 (6th Cir. 2006) (Gilman, J.,
dissenting); see also Lewis v. Hughs, 475 F. Supp. 3d 597, 618 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
(looking to Bush v. Gore’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause without
deciding whether it “provides binding precedent”).
204. See Jurado v. Davis, No. 08CV1400, 2018 WL 4405418, at *149 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2018), aff’d, 12 F.4th 1084 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Roybal v. Davis, 148
F. Supp. 3d 958, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (noting the “expressly limited nature of
the Supreme Court’s holding”).
205. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 35 n.2 (2013)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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docket decisions. 206 And because the acceptance of a
precedent by lower courts is influenced in part by the
Supreme Court’s positive treatment of that precedent in its
later opinions, 207 the Court’s reticence to cite Bush v. Gore
has likely contributed to lower-court reluctance to treat it as
fully controlling. Bush v. Gore thus exists as a kind of clouded
precedent—applied by some courts, questioned by others,
and ignored if possible.
Lower courts reached different conclusions about
whether and how to apply Bush v. Gore as precedent, as they
also seem to have done, at least initially, with Tandon. And
the Supreme Court has completely avoided citing Bush v.
Gore in the majority opinion of a merits decision, much as the
majority declined to cite Tandon in Fulton. If Bush v. Gore is
indeed a relevant model for Tandon, the application of
Tandon’s most-favored-right principle may continue to be
chaotic and uneven. The most-favored-right principle will
certainly be advanced in future cases, supported by citations
to Tandon and accepted by some lower courts. But if that
principle is to become a uniformly applied doctrine in freeexercise cases, the Supreme Court will likely need to
articulate it outside of the shadow docket. 208
V. TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SHADOW DOCKET
In Hunter v. Bryant, Justice Kennedy dissented from a
per curiam decision simultaneously granting certiorari,
vacating the decision below, and remanding for further
reconsideration (a procedure known as GVR), asserting that
“[t]he importance” of the questions presented “suggests that

206. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 34
n.1 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid,
141 S. Ct. 732, 733 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 21, at 117.
208. Cf. id. (suggesting the Supreme Court’s subsequent positive treatment of
a decision directly correlates to its precedential effect).
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we should not dispose of them in summary fashion.” 209
“Given . . . the precedential weight that later courts will
accord to all of the questions presented in the case and
addressed here in express terms or by clear implication,”
Justice Kennedy stated that he “would set the case for full
briefing and oral argument.” 210
Justice Kennedy’s concern with informal procedures was
later echoed by Justice Scalia in a dissent criticizing the
Court’s evolving GVR procedures:
When the Constitution divides our jurisdiction into “original
Jurisdiction” and “appellate Jurisdiction,” I think it conveys, with
respect to the latter, the traditional accoutrements of appellate
power. There doubtless is room for some innovation, . . . but the
innovation cannot be limitless without altering the nature of the
power conferred. 211

In an early COVID-19 case, Chief Justice Roberts
cautioned that the unelected judiciary should be especially
reticent to overturn the actions of politically accountable
representatives where “a party seeks emergency relief in an
interlocutory posture.” 212 And during the editing of this
article, the Court struck down the Center for Disease
Control’s COVID-19 eviction moratorium, over the objection
of Justice Breyer that the Court ruled “without full briefing
or argument.” 213 These varied process-based concerns apply
to the Court’s increasingly vigorous assertion of its power
through the shadow docket, 214 and the early experience of

209. 502 U.S. 224, 235 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 163, 189–90 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2).
212. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.).
213. See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct.
2485, 2490 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
214. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2500 (2021)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Tandon would seem to support the apprehensive skeptics.
Indeed, if stare decisis is “a sensible rule because, among
other things, it protects the reliance interests of those who
have structured their affairs in accordance with the Court’s
existing cases,” 215 then the rule necessitates that the
Supreme Court articulate the law with clarity and certainty,
following regular procedures, in opinions with unambiguous
application. Otherwise, the ability to knowingly structure
interests in accordance with the law is impaired.
Significant articulations of the law in emergency
decisions like Tandon create unnecessary hurdles for the
lower courts that must interpret and apply them. Their
precedential status is uncertain, and it becomes even more
so when the Court ignores them in future opinions, as it has
done with Bush v. Gore and seemed to do with Tandon in
Fulton. Their abbreviated, and usually unsigned, opinions do
not explain legal principles with the exacting detail typically
used by most Supreme Court merits decisions. And the
rushed procedures that produce them, while perhaps
unavoidable in emergency situations, are poorly suited to
producing final and unreviewable expressions of legal
doctrine. Small wonder that courts tasked with applying
them produce inconsistent results.
Critics may challenge the legal significance of the oftencriticized features of shadow docket opinions. Why should it
matter if an opinion is unsigned, issued without oral
argument, or rushed? It is, after all, still an opinion issued
by the Supreme Court. But there are important reasons why
these characteristics should matter.
There is, of course, no constitutional requirement that
opinions be signed by an individual judge, and some have
questioned the wisdom of the practice. 216 But the norm of the
215. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Originalism, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1921, 1921 (2017).
216. See James Markham, Note, Against Individually Signed Judicial
Opinions, 56 DUKE L.J. 923, 942–48 (2006).
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Supreme Court indicating which justice authored its critical
opinions makes good sense for several reasons. First,
Congress plays a limited but important role in overseeing
and empowering the Court. 217 The Senate is charged with
providing advice and consent on nominees; 218 Congress holds
responsibility for impeaching justices where necessary; 219
and the Court’s power to exercise authority beyond its
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction is granted by
statute. 220 Unsigned opinions make it difficult for Congress
to track and evaluate the work of individual justices,
obscuring the Court’s decision making process from the
legislative branch and hindering oversight and review.
Just as importantly, in a constitutional system that
grants federal judges lifetime tenure, one of the only real
constraints on judicial behavior is the public reputation of
judges and justices—a constraint that is weakened when
they avoid taking personal responsibility for consequential
and controversial opinions like Bush v. Gore or Tandon. This
concern motivated Thomas Jefferson’s opposition to judicial
opinions that fail to identify the position of each judge, as
Jefferson wrote that:
Judges holding their offices for life are under two responsibilities
only.1. Impeachment [and] 2. individual reputation. . . . [A]s to the
[second] guarantee, personal reputation, it is shielded compleatly
[sic] [when judges do not individually explain their decisions]. The
practice is certainly convenient, for the lazy, the modest[, and] the
incompetent. 221

217. See Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional
Constraints on the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 1987–2000, 31 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 533, 535–36, 555–56 (2006) (discussing theoretical mechanisms for
Congress to constrain the Court and finding historical evidence of such constraint
being exercised).
218. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (power to grant stays); 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (power
to issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of the Court’s jurisdiction).
221. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 12
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 246, 249–50 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).
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Though Jefferson’s preferred solution—that decisions be
delivered seriatim, with each judge delivering their
individual opinion on a given case 222—did not catch on in the
United States judicial system, his concerns remain relevant
to per curiam opinions.
As for the importance of oral argument—and the
consequences of key cases being decided in its absence—one
has only to look to the words of the justices themselves.
Though some significant justices, including Earl Warren and
Oliver Wendell Holmes, did not find oral arguments
especially determinative, 223 many others have publicly
commented on the valuable role that argument plays. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote that, in a “significant minority” of
the cases in which he heard oral argument, especially those
involving areas of the law in which he was least familiar, he
left the bench feeling differently about the outcome than he
felt before hearing argument. 224 Justice Potter Stewart said
that he never knew more about a case than he did
immediately after oral argument. 225 Justice Scalia wrote
that issues “can be put in perspective during oral argument
in a way that they can’t in a written brief.” 226 Justice Douglas
wrote that oral argument can win or lose a case, 227 and
Justice Jackson believed that most justices “form at least a
tentative conclusion” from oral argument “in a large
percentage of the cases.” 228
Moreover, an analysis of Justice Blackmun’s archival

222. See id. at 279–80.
223. DAVID M. O’BRIEN. STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT
POLITICS 247 (7th ed. 2005).
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224. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 276
(1987).
225. See id. at 287.
226. O’BRIEN, supra note 223, at 247.
227. See id.
228. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 37
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2 (1951).
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notes, which contained his evaluations of lawyers’
performances during oral argument, found that even when
controlling for their ideologies, justices were significantly
more likely to rule on behalf of the party whose counsel
performed better at oral argument. 229 Another empirical
study found “direct evidence that both attorneys and justices
convey persuasive information during oral arguments.” 230
The apparent importance of oral argument in the Court’s
regular decision-making process suggests that cases decided
without it, like Tandon, may fail to fully explore potential
issues or to convey the nuances of particular doctrines.
As for the rushed nature of shadow docket opinions,
while it is commendable that the Court can rule quickly
when forced to address an emergency, speed necessarily
reduces the time available to refine and improve opinions. In
traditional merits cases, the importance and divisiveness of
an issue tends to increase the time it takes to issue an
opinion. 231 The circulation of draft opinions allows justices to
switch their vote if they are persuaded, while allowing an
opinion’s author to adjust their legal reasoning in response
to criticism. 232 For example, the articulation of a right to
privacy in the landmark Griswold v. Connecticut, 233 written
by Justice Douglas, was heavily influenced by Justice
Brennan’s response to an early draft. 234 Time also allows
justices to build consensus in cases where avoiding
divisiveness is particularly important. Recognizing the need
for a unanimous opinion overturning school segregation,
229. See Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The
Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
99, 99–100, 111–12 (2006).
230. Eve M. Ringsmuth, Amanda C. Bryan & Timothy R. Johnson, Voting
Fluidity and Oral Argument on the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RSCH. Q. 429,
435 (2013).
231. O’BRIEN, supra note 223, at 271.
232. See id. at 272–81.
233. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
234. O’BRIEN, supra note 223, at 276–77.
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Chief Justice Warren kept Brown v. Board of Education 235
on the docket for more than a year, continually carrying it
over at conferences until he was able to build a unanimous
consensus. 236 These important tools for refining and
improving opinions are lost in shadow docket emergency
decisions. These concerns animated Justice Kagan’s recent
dissent in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, in which she
criticized the Court’s ruling on the basis of only “cursory
party submissions.” 237
Tandon, and the pandemic cases in general, suggest that
caution is in order when the Court receives applications for
emergency relief. Without question, the Supreme Court may
and should grant or deny requests for stays where
extraordinary relief is warranted. But the disposition of such
cases is not the appropriate place for new formulations of
legal doctrine, and the uniformity and consistency of the
lower federal courts will suffer if the Court decides
otherwise. Tandon is a step in the wrong direction.

235. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
236. See O’BRIEN, supra note 223, at 252–53.
237. See 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2500 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

